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INTRODUCTION

The common law of Illinois and several specific statutory enactments provide the state with its evidentiary rules. The Illinois
Supreme Court and the appellate districts have chosen the methodology of selective review of the Federal Rules of Evidence for possible adoption. During the Survey year, the courts continued the
process of modifying the common law rules on the admissibility of
expert testimony so that they conform more closely with the federal rules. With few exceptions, state courts are broadening the
admissibility of expert opinions on an increasingly greater number
of subjects, The courts of Illinois also continued, during this past
year, to develop the state of the law on the admissibility of habit
testimony. The purpose of this article is to inform the reader of
those recent developments in the Illinois law of evidence and to
comment upon any trends that may be developing.
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law, Director, Professional Skills
Program at DePaul; A.B., 1967, Hamilton College; J.D., 1971, Georgetown University
Law Center.
** B.A., 1986, The George Washington University; J.D. candidate, 1989, Loyola
University of Chicago.
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RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

Admissibility of Similar Occurrences

In Ballweg v. City of Springfield,' the Illinois Supreme Court re-

affirmed its position regarding the admissibility of similar occurrences in strict tort liability cases. Relying on Rucker v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co.,2 the court held that evidence of prior occurrences

presented at trial must be "substantially similar '

3

to the occur-

rence in the case at bar to be admissible.
In Ballweg, the plaintiff's decedent, a passenger on a Hobie Cat
catamaran, was electrocuted after the boat's mast made contact

with an overhead power line.5 At trial, the plaintiff introduced

charts indicating prior accidents involving contacts between Hobie
Cat masts and power lines.6 The plaintiff introduced the charts to

indicate that the defendant boat manufacturer had prior notice of
the Hobie Cat's dangerous condition.7 On appeal, the appellate
court held that the admission of this evidence constituted reversible error because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a "substantially similar" design defect caused the prior accidents.' The
Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the evidence
presented in the charts was "substantially similar" enough because
it showed electrocutions resulting from Hobie Cat contacts between masts and power lines, regardless of the particular design
defect responsible. The charts were, therefore, properly admitted
to suggest that the boat manufacturer had notice of the danger.9
1. 114 Il1.2d 107, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (1986). See also Ogg v. City of Springfield, 121
Il. App. 3d 25, 458 N.E.2d 1331 (4th Dist. 1984) (disposition of an appeal based upon
the same facts involved in Balweg).
2. 77 Ill.
2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979).
3. Id. at 441, 396 N.E.2d at 538.
4. Ballweg, 114 Ill.
2d at 114, 123, 499 N.E.2d at 1376, 1380.
5. Id. at 112, 499 N.E.2d at 1375.
6. Id. at 114, 499 N.E.2d at 1376. The charts indicated each accident's date, location, and resulting deaths and injuries. They did not, however, describe the accidents'
exact nature. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 114-15, 499 N.E.2d at 1376. Specifically, the court noted that the evidence
established that the Hobie Cat: (1) "is composed of multiple all metal connective pathways"; (2) can electrocute users; and (3) "can electrocute a person in contact with the
boat or several hundred people up to 100 feet away in water. . . ." Id. In addition, the
court held that, although the plaintiff's testimony regarding remedial actions taken by
the city to warn passing boats of the power lines and in submerging other power lines was
inadmissible in an action against the boat manufacturer, the error was harmless. Id. at
115, 499 N.E.2d at 1376.
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In Anderson v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co.,"1 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that under Illinois law, factual
details of prior accidents are not admissible to show the extrahazardous nature of an accident site absent a showing that the
accidents were of a similar nature." In Anderson, the defendant's
train struck the plaintiff's car at a railroad crossing. The plaintiff
attempted to establish that the defendant railroad was liable for
willful and wanton misconduct because it had knowledge of a
number of prior accidents at the crossing in question. The failure
of the defendant to act, the plaintiff's argument continued, "exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others by allowing the
crossing to remain in a dangerous condition."' 2 The defendant,
however, claimed that it was aware of only three accidents at this
crossing in the last ten years. 13
The trial court permitted the plaintiff's witness, a librarian, to
testify about the dates of newspaper articles regarding prior accidents and casualties at the crossing.' 4 Although this evidence was
admitted for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility
regarding its knowledge of prior accidents, ihe court would not
admit the articles themselves as evidence of notice to the defendant.' 5 Therefore, the appellate court held that the trial court did
not err in limiting the testimony of the librarian who presented this
evidence. 16

B. Other Crimes Evidence
In People v. Barrios,'7 the defendant was charged with driving on
a revoked license. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a tran10. 147 I11.
App. 3d 960, 498 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1986).
11. Id. at 974, 498 N.E.2d at 595-96.
12. Id. at 968, 498 N.E.2d at 591-92.
13. Id. at 968, 498 N.E.2d at 592.
14. Id. at 974, 498 N.E.2d at 595.
15. Id. at 974, 498 N.E.2d at 595-96.
16. Id. at 973-74, 498 N.E.2d at 595. The parties disputed whether Illinois or Indiana law should govern the admissibility of the evidence. Although there is a discrepancy
between Indiana and Illinois. law concerning the admissibility of evidence establishing the
existence of previous accidents, the two states are in agreement that substantial similarity
between accidents is required before the details of these prior accidents can be admitted.
Id. at 974, 498 N.E.2d at 595-96. Illinois law does not require a showing of similarity
between accidents in presenting evidence of previous accidents. Indiana does require a
showing of similarity when presenting evidence of previous accidents. The Anderson
court also noted that even if the plaintiffs were able to prove that the defendant had
knowledge of additional accidents, this evidence would not necessarily indicate willful
and wanton misconduct. The plaintiffs did not present evidence that the defendant knew
of, and refused to correct, a specific hazard. Id. at 968, 498 N.E.2d at 592.
17. 114 Ill.
2d 265, 500 N.E.2d 415 (1986).
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script from a 1983 proceeding in which the same defendant was
charged with the same offense was properly admitted into evidence.' 8 In Barrios, the court recognized that the trial court had
instructed the jury that the "transcript was admitted into evidence
solely for the purpose of showing the defendant's knowledge as to
the status of his driving privileges."' 9 Therefore, the defendant
was not prejudiced by the judge's reading, was not denied any right
to confront witnesses, and the admission of the transcript did not
constitute inadmissible hearsay.20
C. Habit and Routine Practice
In Ruffiner v. Material Service Corp.,2I the Illinois Supreme
Court reiterated the long standing rule that industry, trade, or regulatory group standards can set the standard of care in negligence
actions. The court, however, refused to allow the admission of the
standards that would be applicable in the case because the "special
arrangement" of the defendant rendered the standards irrelevant.22
The court did not discuss the alternative of allowing the jury to
hear the standards and then to judge their proper weight in the
assessment of negligence based upon the particular circumstances.
In Ruffiner, the plaintiff fell from a ladder that led up to a retractable pilot house aboard the defendant's towboat.2 3 At trial, the
court allowed the plaintiff to introduce expert testimony based on
standards promulgated by the American National Standards Institute (the "ANSI") that suggested that the pilot house ladders did
not conform to standards applicable to fixed ladders. 24 The appellate court affirmed, and rejected the defendant's contention that the
ANSI standards regarding fixed ladders were not relevant because
they were not intended to apply to the ,special arrangement" of
ladders necessary to operate a retractable pilot house.25
18. Id. at 275, 500 N.E.2d at 419.
19. Id. at 276, 500 N.E.2d at 419.
20. Id. at 275, 500 N.E.2d at 419. The defendant was sentenced to four years in
prison for making the false statements. Id. at 266-67, 500 N.E.2d at 419-20.
21. 116 Ill. 2d 53, 506 N.E.2d 581 (1987).
22. Id. at 58, 506 N.E.2d at 584. See also Merchants National Bank v. Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Ry. Co., 49 I11.2d 118, 125, 273 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1971) (standards referring to a
grade-crossing at a railroad crossing set out in publication by Department of Public
Works and Buildings properly admitted even though standards were not adopted by
Commerce Commission); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d
326, 330-32, 211 N.E.2d 253, 256-57 (1965) (regulations, standards, and by-laws served
same function as evidence of custom in displaying hospital negligence).
23. Ruffiner, 116 Ill. 2d at 55, 506 N.E.2d at 582.
24. Id. at 56-57, 506 N.E.2d at 583.
25. Id. at 56, 506 N.E.2d at 585.

19881

Evidence

The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the defendant's initial
contention regarding the relevancy of the ANSI standards, and re-

versed the lower court. 6 The court held that the admission of
ANSI standards regarding construction guidelines and dimensions
of fixed ladders, such as those used in factories, powei stations, and
other land-based industrial facilities, was error because the stan27
dards did not apply to the situation involved in the case at bar.
The court stated that in order to be admissible, the standards must
be relevant "in terms of both time and conduct involved. ' 28 The
Ruffiner court concluded that the ANSI standards were not relevant to shipboard ladders. The standards, therefore, were erroneously admitted into evidence.29
In Bradfield v. Ill. Central Gulf R.R. Co. ,30 the Illinois Supreme

Court affirmed an appellate court's decision to admit habit testimony regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses. 3 ' Previously,

habit testimony was admissible in wrongful death cases only when
no eyewitness was present.32

In Bradfield, the plaintiff's decedent was killed when his automobile was struck by the defendant's train. 3 At trial, the court
admitted testimony of the plaintiff, the decedent's widow, and the

plaintiff's son regarding the defendant railroad's alleged failure in
26. Id. at 59, 506 N.E.2d at 584-85.
27. Id. at 58, 506 N.E.2d at 584-85.
28. Id. at 58, 506 N.E.2d at 584 (quoting Murphy v. Messerschmidt, 68 111. 2d 79, 84,
368 N.E.2d 1299, 1302 (1977)).
29. Id. at 59-60, 506 N.E.2d at 585. See Galindo v. Riddell, Inc., 107 I11.
App. 3d
139, 437 N.E.2d 376 (3d Dist. 1982) (standards applicable to headgear used in vehicular
crashes were properly excluded in action for injuries sustained from the use of allegedly
defective football helmet); Cf. Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 77 Il1. 2d 434, 396
N.E.2d 534 (1979) (federal standards relating to construction of liquefied petroleum gas
tank cars held admissible in action based on explosion of a iank car); Anderson v. Hyster
Co., 74 IU1.2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690 (1979) (admission of conflicting testimony concerning
applicability of certain standards to forklift trucks was not error); Davis v. Marathon Oil
Co., 64 I11.
2d 380, 356 N.E.2d 93 (1976) (regulation governing location of gasoline fill
pipes at service station held admissible in action based on explosion during delivery of
gasoline to station); Merchants National Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry.,
49 Ill. 2d 118, 273 N.E.2d 809 (1971) (state standards regarding railway crossings held
admissible in railway crossing accident action).
30. 115 Ill. 2d 471, 505 N.E.2d 331 (1987).
31. Id. at 476, 505 N.E.2d at 334. For a discussion of the appellate court's decision,
see Cavise & Tomassi, Evidence, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 542
(1986).
32. Bradfield, 115 Ill. 2d at 473, 505 N.E.2d at 332. See, e.g., Gardner v. Geraghty,
98 Ill. App. 3d 10, 15, 423 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (1st Dist. 1981) (evidence of decedent
pedestrian's careful habits held admissible when defendant's testimony was determined
insufficient to provide eyewitness account of decedent pedestrian's conduct prior to being
struck by defendant's automobile while crossing street).
33. Bradfield, 115 111. 2d at 472, 505 N.E.2d at 332.
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the past to comply with the requirement of sounding the train's
34
whistle or horn at a designated distance from a railroad crossing.
The plaintiff contended that a similar failure to sound the train's
whistle resulted in the collision between the defendant's train and
the decedent's car.35
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the appellate court erred in rejecting a long-standing
rule that the presence of an eyewitness precludes the admission of
habit testimony.3 6 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision to reject this rule and to follow Federal Rule
of Evidence 406, which rejects the eyewitness requirement.37 The
defendant also contended that, even if the court were to adopt the
approach of Rule 406, an inadequate foundation had been laid to
show that there was an adequate sampling and uniformity of response sufficient to prove habit. The court held that, because that
argument was not preserved by specific objection, the argument is
waived on appeal and would not be decided by the court. 8
A strong dissent argued that a relevancy objection such as the
one here is sufficient to preserve a full argument on the habit question, and, in fact, the plaintiff's testimony had not shown a pattern
of conduct sufficient to withstand careful scrutiny in determining
whether or not a habit or custom exists. 9
In First National Bank of Antioch v. Guerra Construction Co.,"
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that evidence of a sender's general mailing procedures is insufficient to establish receipt by the addressee, unless the evidence is supported by
other corroborating evidence that the procedure was followed in
the particular instance or that the material was received. 4 ' In
34. Id. at 473, 505 N.E.2d at 332.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 474, 505 N.E.2d at 333. The defendant contended that the appellate court
should have followed Plank v. Holman, 46 Ill. 2d 465, 264 N.E.2d 12 (1970), reaffirming
the long-standing rule mentioned above.
37. Bradfield, 115 IM. 2d at 473-76, 505 N.E.2d at 333-34. FED. R. EViD. 406
provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization,
whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular
occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
38. Bradfield, 115 Il1.2d at 474, 505 N.E.2d'at 333.
39. Id. at 476-81, 505 N.E.2d at 334-36.
40. 153 IM.App. 3d 662, 505 N.E.2d 1373 (2d Dist. 1987).
41. Id. at 667, 505 N.E.2d at 1376.
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Guerra, the defendant 2 owed money to an excavating and landscaping company for services rendered. In addition, the excavating
company was indebted to the plaintiff bank for numerous loans.
As security for these loans, the company assigned its accounts receivable to a bank. When the company went bankrupt, the bank
attempted to notify all of the company's debtors and to request
them to make future payments directly to the bank. The bank filed
a collections suit after not receiving a final payment from the defendant. At issue was whether the bank properly notified the defendant regarding the assignment. 3
The bank argued that it was entitled to a presumption of receipt
not only from the general rule that correspondence is presumed to
have been received when it is properly addressed, posted, and deposited in the mail, but also from its general office practice regarding mailing. That office practice, said the bank, should be sufficient
when accompanied either by some evidence that the practice was
followed in the particular instance in question or by other corroborating evidence. 4

After denying the receipt of notice and thereby relieving itself of
the obligation to pay, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff's evidence4" regarding its customary mailing procedures did not establish that it had followed the procedures on this occasion, and,
further, that neither sufficient corroboration nor facts showing that
the practice was followed here were shown to exist.46 Relying on
42. Three defendants were named. On appeal, however, Hill-Behan Lumber Company was the only party. Id. at 663, 505 N.E.2d at 1374.
43. Id. at 664, 505 N.E.2d at 1374.
44. Id. at 667-68, 505 N.E.2d at 1377.
45. The supervisor of plaintiff's data processing department described the mailing
procedures:
Mail was taken to the mail operations department by clerks and secretaries,
who placed it in one of two bins, one for Antioch mail and one for out-of-town
mail. A postal clerk then collected the mail, weighed it, affixed postage with a
meter, placed it in postal trays and took it to the post office. Any mail returned
by the post office would be routed to the audit department and would eventually
be returned to the person who originated it.
Id. at 665, 505 N.E.2d at 1374-75.
46. Id. at 667, 505 N.E.2d at 1376. The defendant relied on the following three cases
to support his proposition: Lynn v. Village of West City, 36 I11.App. 3d 561, 345 N.E.2d
172 (5th Dist. 1976) (insurance agent testified about his practice of notifying insurance
company of a claim, but he did not know if the procedure was followed on this occasion
because he did not mail it himself); Goetz v. Country Mutual Ins., 28 I11.App. 3d 154,
328 N.E.2d 109 (2d Dist. 1975) (testimony consisted solely of the insurer's customary
practice); Buckingham Corp. v. Ewing Liquors, 15 Ill. App. 3d 839, 305 N.E.2d 278 (1st
Dist. 1973) (employer used a mailing service and, therefore, had no personal knowledge
of the mailing procedures). The Guerra court held that these cases were not relevant.
Guerra, 153 I11.App. 3d at 667, 505 N.E.2d at 1376.
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Tabor & Co. v. Gorenz,4 7 in which the plaintiff presented evidence
of other corroborating circumstances in addition to evidence on the
custom of preparing confirmation forms,48 the supreme court affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court acknowledged that the corroborating evidence supported the evidence of
custom, including the preparation and typing of notices of assignment and a telephone acknowledgement from the defendant of
their receipt. 49 No direct testimony from the person who actually
performed the mailing was necessary. 50
D.

Use of Videotapes

In Georgacopoulos v. University of Chicago Hospitals and Clinics, ' the First District Appellate Court admitted a controversial
"Day in the Life" videotape of the plaintiff during a painful physical therapy session.5 2 The court found that the tape was probative,
non-cumulative, and not prejudicial.5 3 The key question in these
cases is commonly the possible prejudicial or inflammatory effect
of the videotape, given that many of the tapes portray seriously
injured plaintiffs engaged in activity rendered difficult by their injuries. Illinois courts have yet to discuss the possible hearsay implications of a videotape that is made in contemplation of litigation
and includes conduct that is meant to make "assertions" for the
out-of-court declarant. In this case, there was no undue prejudice,
said the court, because the therapy session amounted to only a few
minutes of the nineteen minute videotape and because it was
"tasteful." 54
III. WITNESSES
In Herron v. Underwood,55 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fifth District held that a trial court properly allowed a trustee's
testimony regarding the delivery of certain deeds by a decedent
47.
48.

43 Ill. App. 3d 124, 356 N.E.2d 1150 (2d Dist. 1976).
Tabor, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 130, 356 N.E.2d at 1151-52.

49. Guerra, 153 111. App. 3d at 669, 505 N.E.2d at 1377. The corroborating evidence
included testimony of a commercial loan clerk who stated that she recalled preparing and
delivering the notices to the mail room because she had never done it before. In addition,
the vice-president of the bank testified that he spoke with the defendant's employee who
said the notice had been received. Id. at 668, 505 N.E.2d at 1377.
50. Id.
51. 152 Ill. App. 3d 596, 504 N.E.2d 830 (1st Dist. 1987).
52. Id. at 599, 504 N.E.2d at 833.

53. Id. at 599, 504 N.E.2d at 832.
54. Id. at 599, 504 N.E.2d at 832-33.
55. 152 Ill. App. 3d 144, 503 N.E.2d 1111 (5th Dist. 1987).
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over the objection that the testimony violated the Dead-Man's
Act. 6 In Herron, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment construing various documents.- 7 Among these documents were three
deeds which the decedent had executed during his lifetime and
placed with a third party. 8 At trial, a trustee who was a named
party-defendant testified about her conversations with the decedent
regarding the deeds. 59 Other parties-defendant contended that the
trustee's testimony violated the Dead-Man's Act because she was
an adverse party under the act. 6 In response to this contention,
the court stated that "[i]t is settled that an adverse party for purposes of the statute is determined by an analysis of actual interests
rather than by his or her formal designation as a party. "61
In Herron, the trustee did not have an actual interest in the outcome of the case.62 One of the defendants, however, asserted in her
brief that "[w]hile [the trustee] may not have benefited directly and
financially from her testimony, she did have a definite emotional
interest in seeing that her brother's 'new wife' did not get her
hands on his estate."' 63 The court held that a disqualifying interest
must be of a pecuniary nature and that an emotional interest only
reflects upon the credibility of the witness. 64

IV. OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
In Melecosky v. McCarthy Brothers Co.,65 the Illinois Supreme
56. Id. at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 1113. The Dead-Man's Act provides in pertinent part:
In the trial of any action in whtch any party sues or defends as the representative of a deceased person ... , no adverse party or person directly interested in
the action shall be allowed to testify on his or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased... or to any event which took place in the presence of
the deceased....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-201 (1985).
57. Herron, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 503 N.E.2d at 1113.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 150, 503 N.E.2d at 1115-16.
60. Id. at 152-53, 503 N.E.2d at 1117.

61.

Id. at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 1117. See E.

GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE

CLEARY

& M.

GRAHAM, CLEARY &

§ 606.3 (4th Ed. 1984).

62. Herron, 152 Il. App. 3d at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 1117.
63. Id. at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 1118.
64. Id. See also Michalski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 50 Ill. App. 3d 335, 365
N.E.2d 654 (1st Dist. 1977) (possibility of malpractice suit on attorney in charge of deeds
was too remote to render him an interested person precluding him from testifying under
the Dead-Man's Act); In re Estate of Truman v. Gentz, 32 Ill. App. 3d 886, 336 N.E.2d

766 (2d Dist. 1975) (attorney who drew up deeds for decedent was not interested party
because no pecuniary gain or loss will come to witness as result of decree).
65. 115 Ill. 2d 209, 503 N.E.2d 355 (1986). Since last year's Survey, the supreme
court reversed the appellate court's decision. See Cavise & Tomassi, supra note 31 at 534-

35.
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Court continued its recent pattern of adopting the federal rules on
the admissibility of expert testimony and, in this case, erased the
long-held testimonial distinction between the treating and nontreating physician. The appellate court had held that a non-treating doctor's deposition could not be introduced into evidence when
based on a plaintiff's self-serving and subjective complaints of pain
during an examination by a non-treating physician.6 6 Illinois traditionally has held that subjective statements are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule only when made to a treating
physician.67

The court offered several reasons for its shift towards the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court had already held, in Wilson v.
Clark 68 and its progeny, that Federal Rules 703 and 705, allowing
expert opinion to be based upon facts not in evidence (including
hearsay), was applicable in Illinois. The rationale for the rule is
that the facts or data upon which an expert would reasonably rely
are, ordinarily, of a high degree of reliability themselves, such as
hospital records. In Melecosky, a Structural Work Act case, the
court extends that recognition of reliability to the out-of-court subjective complaints made by the plaintiff to the physician hired by
him for purposes of trial. Of particular importance to the court
was that the rules are designed "to bring the judicial practice in
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in
court."69 Thus, facts and data inadmissible on their own, that are
reasonably relied upon in a particular field, can be used as the basis
of an expert's opinion. 70 In Melecosky, the court allowed the testimony of the non-treating physician, including the subjective com66. Melecosky, 115 11. 2d at 216-17, 503 N.E.2d at 358.
67.

Id. at 214, 503 N.E.2d at 357. Since Wilson v. Clark, 84 I11.
2d 186, 417 N.E.2d

1322 (1981), which adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, there has been a
digression away from these traditional rules.

R. EVID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion

FED.

or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data upon cross examination.
68. 84 Ill.
2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
69. Melecosky, 115 Ill. 2d at 215, 503 N.E.2d 358 (citing FED. R. EViD. 703 advisory
committee note).

70. Id.
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plaints of the plaintiff to the expert, and stated that "since experts
in their own practice normally rely on such statements it is consistent with the purposes of Rule 703 .' 71 The court held that it was
error not to admit the non-treating expert's testimony, and that
any questions regarding the testimony goes to its weight and not its
admissibility.72
In People v. Johnson,7 a the Illinois Supreme Court addressed, for
the first time, the admissibility of neutron-activation analysis("NA-A") results. 74 The questions were whether the N-A-A test was
sufficiently reliable to determine whether cartridges found in the
defendant's home were manufactured on the same day as bullets
found in the victim's body, and whether the results of the test were
conclusive enough for admissibility.
At trial, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
testified that the absence of arsenic in the samples prevented an
absolute determination of the bullets' and cartridges' origin. He
stated, however, that the fact that arsenic was not found in either
sample and the very close copper and antimony compositions of
the bullets tested indicated that the samples "would commonly be
expected to be found among bullets within the same box of cartridges with compositions just like these, and that [i.e., another box
of cartridges close in composition] could best be found from the
same type and manufacture packaged on the same day. "76
The defendant apparently did not contest that N-A-A is a generally accepted scientific process worthy of acceptance in Illinois
under the test of Frye v. United States.77 Relying on State v. Holt,7s
the defendant contended that expert opinions "expressing less certitude than a 'probability' or an 'actuality' in interpreting the results of a neutron-activation analysis are incompetent." 79 The
court observed, however, that when Holt was decided, the N-A-A
71. Id. at 216, 503 N.E.2d at 358. "As Wilson points out, Rule 703 on its face makes
no distinction between treating and non-treating experts." Id. at 216, 503 N.E.2d 358
(citing Wilson v. Clark, 84 111. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981)).
72. Melecosky, 115 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 503 N.E.2d at 358-59. This error mandates a
new trial on the issue of damages only. Id. at 217, 503 N.E.2d at 358-59.
73. 114 Ill. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986).
74. Id. at 195, 499 N.E.2d at 1366. "[Neutron-activation analysis is a two-phase
method of instrumental chemial analysis, which detects, in parts per million, trace elements in a sample of material for the purpose of identifying the source of the material."
Id.
75. Id. at 194-95, 499 N.E.2d at 1366.
76. Id. at 196, 499 N.E.2d at 1366.
77. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
78. 17 Ohio St. 2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969).
79. Johnson, 114 Ill.
2d at 196, 499 N.E.2d at 1366.
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test was not a generally proven science.80 Since that time, a majority of jurisdictions have accepted N-A-A results as a consistently
reliable forensic-science technique, admissible in criminal proceedings."1 Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "any
lack of certitude in a qualified expert's testimony, or inconclusiveness in the results of an otherwise reliable neutron-activation analysis, goes 2to the weight and not the admissibility of such
8
evidence.
In People v. Bryant,8 3 filed the same day as Johnson, the Illinois

Supreme Court held that it was error for an expert witness to give
his opinion that pieces of glass found on the defendant's shoes

more probably than not had a common origin with the glass samples taken at the scene of an attempted burglary.8 4 The court ac-

knowledged that it was common for an expert to testify, as he did
here and as the expert did in Johnson, that scientific tests demonstrate that physical evidence is "consistent" with the origin of the
known standard.85 In Bryant, however, the expert testified that

there was "a good probability that the glass that [was found] in the
shoe came from the same source as the glass standard. ' 86 The
court held that admission of this opinion was erroneous because

there was no testimony regarding the frequency of finding glass of
the same origin and the probability that the glass was derived from

a common source.

7

The court determined that the expert's testi-

80. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d at 85, 246 N.E.2d at 367.
81. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 197, 499 N.E.2d at 1367. See, e.g., Chatom v. State, 348
So. 2d 838 (Ala. 1977); Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980); Mills v. State, 476 So.
2d 172 (Fla. 1985); State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 592 P.2d 836 (1979); State v. Ulrich,
187 Mont. 347, 609 P.2d 1218 (1980); State v. Journey, 201 Neb. 607, 271 N.W.2d 320
(1978); Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 475 Pa. 179, 379 A.2d 1342 (1977).
82. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 197, 499 N.E.2d at 1367. The court also dismissed the
defendant's contention that his guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. "[lit is
well established in Illinois that identification of the accused by a single eyewitness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction, provided that the witness viewed the accused under
circumstances permitting a positive identification." Id. at 189, 499 N.E.2d at 1363. See
also People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 226, 367 N.E.2d 666, 668 (1977); People v.
Jones, 60 Ill. 2d 300, 307-08, 325 N.E.2d 601, 605 (1975); People v. Stringer, 52 Ill. 2d
564, 569, 289 N.E.2d 631, 634 (1972).
83. 113 II1. 2d 497, 499 N.E.2d 413 (1986).
84. Id. at 512-13, 499 N.E.2d at 420-21. The term "standard" refers to the source of
the evidence being examined. In this case the standard is the broken window at the service station.
85. Id. at 513, 499 N.E.2d at 420.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 513, 499 N.E.2d at 420-21. Because the Illinois Supreme Court had already
agreed to affirm the appellate court's granting of a new trial based on an error in instructing the jury, the court reached this issue only on its merits. Id. at 512-14, 499
N.E.2d at 420.
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mony established only that the fragments were consistent and that
the glass "could have" come from the same window."8
In People v. Sanchez,8 9 the Illinois Supreme Court allowed the

presentation of highly magnified photographs of fibers found both
on a decedent and at the scene of the crime. The photographs were
admitted despite cxpert witness testimony that scientific fiber comparisons could, at best, determine consistencies between fibers.1°
The photographs were introduced to support the expert's conclusion that some consistencies existed between the two sets of fibers. 91 The defendant contended that the photographs presented
were "posed" and presented in a manner attributing too much
weight to their significance. 92 The court, however, admitted this
evidence based on the "foundation surrounding the introduction of
the photographs
enabl[ing] the jury to properly consider their
'93
significance.

In Dyback v. Weber,94 the Illinois Supreme Court held that an
expert witness's methodology in determining the cause of a fire was
based upon mere "conjecture and guess" and was therefore of no
consequence in determining negligence. 95 In Dyback, the plaintiff's house caught fire, resulting in its ultimate destruction, while
the defendants were in the process of making repairs caused by a
88. Id. at 513, 499 N.E.2d at 420.
89. 115 Il1. 2d 238, 503 N.E.2d 277 (1986).
90. Id. at 268, 503 N.E.2d at 288. The expert did not testify that the fiber results
were absolutely conclusive or that the fibers were identical. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 267, 503 N.E.2d at 287. In support of his contention, the defendant relied
on two cases which the court determined were factually irrelevant. In French v. City of
Springfield, 65 ll.2d 74, 357 N.E.2d 438 (1976), and People v. Crowe, 390 I11.294, 61
N.E.2d 348 (1945), the evidence in dispute was a recreation of a past event and after-thefact posed photographs, respectively. In the case at bar, however, the evidence depicted
"physical facts as they actually existed at the time of the occurrences in question."
Sanchez, 115 Il1. 2d at 268, 503 N.E.2d at 287.
93. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d at 268, 503 N.E.2d at 288. The foundation to which the
court referred included: forensic evidence, evidence displaying consistencies between
paint applied to the top of the car involved in the crime and found in paint cans in the
defendant's garage, witness testimony stating that the defendant had been seen in the bar
where the victim was picked up, and witness testimony that they had seen handguns and
handcuffs in the defendant's possession. Id. at 254-55, 503 N.E.2d at 281-82.
94. 114 I1l. 2d 232, 500 N.E.2d 8 (1986).
95. Id. at 244-45, 500 N.E.2d at 14. See also Hahn v. Eastern Illinois Office Equip.
Co., 42 Ill. App. 3d 29, 34, 355 N.E.2d 336, 341 (4th Dist. 1976) (experienced fire investigator not permitted to give opinion on cause of fire when based on mere conjecture);
Schwartz v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 35 I11.App. 2d 25, 30, 181 N.E.2d 826, 829
(1st Dist. 1962) (expert witness on combustible materials and thermostats, no matter how
experienced, not permitted to testify about origin of fire when his opinion was based on
%
mere conjecture).
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previous fire.96 The facts revealed that during the time of the repair, there was no gas service to the house. The electrical service
consisted of one outlet used by the defendants to power their portable fuel-oil heater. 97 The defendants had been at the house the day
before the fire, but they stated that because they were there for only
about one hour, they did not use the heater. They did not recall,
however, if they had unplugged the unit.9 8 Plaintiffs sought to infer negligence of the contractors under the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. 99

A licensed public adjuster, qualified as an expert on causes and
origins of fires, testified for the plaintiff that he inspected the house
from the exterior fourteen months after the incident. Relying on
the investigations of another investigator, since deceased, and on
the investigation of the local fire department, the expert concluded
that, although he did not know the origin of the fire, it would not
have occurred but for the heater that was left on the premises.'°°
The supreme court reiterated that, absent a showing that conditions have remained unchanged, post-event inspections are inadmissible.10 1 Based on this premise and the court's conclusion that
the testimony was based on conjecture and guess, the court confirmed the trial court's holding that the "mere presence of the
heater, without more, neither constituted negligence nor reasonably permitted an inference
of negligence that would support the
'02
res ipsa loquitur count."'
In Abrams v. City of Matoon, 10 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fourth District indicated that when a plaintiff's complaint of
ailment is "shrouded in controversy," lay testimony is insufficient
96.

Dyback, 114 Il1. 2d at 236, 500 N.E.2d at 9.

97. Id. at 236, 500 N.E.2d at 9.
98. Id. at 236, 500 N.E.2d at 10.
99. Id. at 238, 500 N.E.2d at 10-11.
100. Id. at 237, 500 N.E.2d at 10.
101. Id. at 244, 500 N.E.2d at 13. See also Canales v. Dominick's Finer Foods, 92
Il1. App. 3d 773, 778, 416 N.E.2d 303, 308 (1st Dist. 1981) (husband's testimony concerning appearance of food store floor one hour and twenty minutes after wife slipped on
greasy ointment was not admissible when no evidence was presented to show that conditions were essentially unchanged); Escher v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d
967, 972, 397 N.E.2d 9, 13 (5th Dist. 1979) (general contractor's testimony regarding
condition of door that caused plaintiff's injury was inadmissible when the contractor
examined the door three-and-one-half years after the accident), aff'd, 82 Ill. 2d 110, 411
N.E.2d 864 (1980); LaSalle National Bank v. Feldman, 78 Ill.
App. 2d 363, 372, 223
N.E.2d 180, 185 (1st Dist. 1966) (expert witness's testimony of post-fire investigation
conducted three days after the fire was inadmissible absent evidence demonstrating that
conditions remained unchanged).
102. Dyback, 114 I11.
2d at 244-45, 500 N.E.2d at 14.
103. 148 II. App. 3d 657, 499 N.E.2d 147 (4th Dist. 1986).
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to establish causation."" In Abrams, the plaintiff was injured in a
rear-end collision with a police car.' 0 5 At trial, the plaintiff testified, over the defendant's objection, that she noticed, among other
injuries, blurred vision after the accident and prior to her arrival at
the emergency room. The plaintiff's optometrist presented substantial evidence regarding a cataract condition which had necessitated prior surgery and the use of a contact lens. The optometrist
indicated that her condition would lead to a decrease in uncor06

rected vision over time.
The court agreed with the defendant's position that medical testimony was needed to establish a casual connection when a preexisting condition existed. 107 In addition, the court held that
contrary to the plaintiff's contention, admission of her testimony
was not harmless error based
on the proportion of damages sought
08
for her alleged eye injury.1
In People v. Server,' °9 the defendant appealed a conviction of one
count of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his nine year old step daughter. 1 0 The defendant argued that admission of expert testimony
regarding the "rape trauma syndrome""' to prove the occurrence

of a sexual act constituted reversible error because it was highly
prejudicial. " 2 The Fourth District, addressing the question for the
first time in Illinois, admitted expert testimony about "rape trauma
syndrome" in an aggravated criminal sexual assault case. The decision followed a clear trend in Illinois toward admitting "expert
testimony regarding psychological syndromes when such evidence
104. Id. at 665, 499 N.E.2d at 152 (quoting Jackson v. Navik, 37 Ill. App. 3d 88, 9596, 346 N.E.2d 116, 123 (2d Dist. 1976)).
105. Abrams, 148 Il1.App. 3d at 659, 346 N.E.2d at 148.
106. Id. at 665, 346 N.E.2d at 150.
107. Id. at 666, 346 N.E.2d at 152-53. The court cited Jackson v. Navik, 37 II1. App.
3d 88, 95-96, 346 N.E.2d 116, 123 (2d Dist. 1976), for the applicable rule.
108. Abrams, 37 I11.App. 3d at 666, 346 N.E.2d at 153. The ultimate verdict of
$30,000 could not, as the plaintiff suggested, have been supported by her neck injury. Id.
109. 148 I11.App. 3d 888, 499 N.E.2d 1019 (4th Dist. 1986).
110. Id. at 890-91, 499 N.E.2d at 1021.
11I. "Rape trauma syndrome" is a form of post-traumatic stress disorder caused by
sexual assault. Id. at 897-98, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
112. Id. at 896, 499 N.E.2d at 1024-25. The defendant also argued that the decision
should be reversed because: he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the
testimony of a Department of Children and Family Services worker was improperly admitted under the corroborative complaint provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, para. 115-10 (1963)); and that the aggravated criminal sexual
assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse statutes are unconstitutional. None of these
contentions were upheld. Id. at 900-02, 499 N.E.2d at 1021.
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aids the trier of fact."' "1 3 The court cited the battered woman and
battered child syndromes, evidence about which has been utilized
by Illinois appellate courts. The threshold question of admissibility, though not explicitly addressed by the court, is whether or not
the rape trauma syndrome has achieved general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community. 1 4 The court stated that it had reviewed the psychological literature and found that the syndrome is
"generally accepted to be a common reaction to a sexual assault." "' 5 The court noted, however, that the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have rejected the admissibility
of the syndrome to prove either lack of consent on the part of the
victim or that a rape did in fact occur." 16 Although this court had
never addressed the admissibility of the rape trauma syndrome, the
court held that when the testimony was used only to display how
child sexual assault victims act, there was no abuse of discretion in
admitting the testimony. 117
The jurisdictions that have admitted rape trauma syndrome testimony specify that it can be admitted for the limited purposes of
proving lack of consent or for explaining how victims customarily
respond to the sexual assault." 8 In Server, the testimony was admitted for the latter purpose, despite the defendant's claim of prejudice." 9 The court held that there was no prejudice when the
expert testified only to the similarities between the victim's emotional, physical, and psychological actions and the same actions
normally found in a child sexual assault victim. 20 The expert
never expressed an opinion about whether the child was sexually
assaulted or whether the defendant was the culprit.' 2 ' The court
recognized the difficulty in proving and defending charges of sexual assault, and stated that because of these difficulties, it is essential to establish that the testimony will be beneficial to the trier of
122
fact and minimally prejudicial to the defendant.
A second related issue addressed by the court was whether or
113. Id. at 898, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
114. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
115. Server, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 898, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
116. See e.g., Allewalt v. Maryland, 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A.2d 664 (1985); People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291 (1984); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo.
1984).
117. Server, 148 IlL. App. 3d at 899, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
118. Id. at 898, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
119. Id. at 898-99, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 896-99, 499 N.E.2d at 1025-26.
122. Id. at 898, 499 N.E.2d at 1026.
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not the witness, a clinical psychologist, was qualified as an expert
in rape trauma syndrome.1 23 The court found that because the witness did not render a final medical or psychiatric opinion, and because there are not yet any degree courses of study in the area, the
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert

testimony. 124
V. HEARSAY
In People v. Strausberger,12 - the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District joined the First District in specifically recognizing
that police reports are admissible under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.1 26 The long-standing rule
that police reports are not admissible as business records under
Supreme Court Rule 236,127 however, remains intact.
In Strausberger,the defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and charged with reckless homicide. The arresting officer, the only witness at the hearing to quash the arrest
and suppress evidence, testified as an adverse witness for the defense. He then testified for the prosecution. The officer stated that
he could not recall the basis for his opinion that the defendant was
intoxicated. To refresh his memory, the officer was permitted to

review his original report. After reviewing the report, the officer
testified that he had noticed the smell of alcohol on the defendant
at the scene of the accident and at the hospital. He also indicated
that his testimony was based solely on1 28
his review of the transcript
without any independent recollection.
The trial court sustained the defendant's objection to the police
report. On appeal, the State contended that the report was admissible under the past recollection recorded exception.' 29 Recognizing a split of authority among the district courts,1 30 the appellate
123. Id. at 899, 499 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
124. Id. at 896-97, 499 N.E.2d at 1024-25.
125. 151 I1. App. 3d 832, 503 N.E.2d 832 (2d Dist. 1987).
126. Id. at 834-35, 503 N.E.2d at 834.
127. ILL. S. Cr. R. 236, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-5(c)(2) (1985).
128. Strausberger, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 833-34, 503 N.E.2d at 833.
129. Id. at 834, 503 N.E.2d at 834.
130. Id. In the First Appellate District, police reports have been determined admissible as past recollections recorded if the proper foundation is laid. Id. See People v.
Carter, 72 Ill. App. 3d 871, 876, 391 N.E.2d 427, 431 (1st Dist. 1979); Rigor v. Howard
Liquors, 10 I1. App. 3d 1004, 1010, 295 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1st Dist. 1973). Although the
Second District has never explicitly adopted the past recollection exception as applied to
police reports, the court has recognized the admissibility of a hospital 'incident book' as
past recollection recorded. Strausberger, 151111. App. 3d at 834, 503 N.E.2d at 834. See
People v. Munoz, 31111 App. 3d 689, 693, 335 N.E.2d 35, 38 (2d Dist. 1975). The Third
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court analogized the police report to a hospital 'incident book,' already found admissible in the Second District. This analogy

stemmed from the similar treatment of the two items in the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and under Supreme Court Rule
236.13' The court also pointed to the Fifth District's recognition of
a First District case that relied on the admissibility of an 'incident
book' for the proposition that a police officer could relate back to

his report as long as a proper foundation has been laid.

32

Because

of the similarity between a hospital 'incident book' and a police

report, the court reversed the lower court's ruling, and1 33held that
the report was admissible as past recollection recorded.
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court continued a
pattern of selective adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This
year, the court rendered decisions establishing closer consistency
with Federal Rules 703 and 705 on the admissibility of expert testimony and reinterpreted existing Illinois case law to conform with
the rules on admissibility of habit and routine practice evidence
under Federal Rule 406. Finally, there appears to be a conflict
developing in the appellate districts on the admissibility of police
reports and hospital records. Long held inadmissible as business
records under Supreme Court Rule 236, the records have now been
held, in at least two districts, as admissible under the hearsay exception for past recollection recorded.

District has explicitly rejected this exception. Strausberger, 151 11. App. 3d at 834-35,
503 N.E.2d at 834. See People v. Burnside, 133 Ill. App. 3d 453, 457, 478 N.E.2d 884,
887 (3d Dist. 1985).
131. Strausberger, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 834, 503 N.E.2d at 834. ILL. S. CT. R. 236,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-5(cX2) (1985).
132. Strausberger, 151 Il1.App. 3d at 835, 503 N.E.2d at 834.
133. Id. It was undisputed that an adequate foundation was laid when the officer
stated that he could not recall specific facts about the incident in question and where he
stated that the report was accurate.

